The edition assesses the strategic potential of Europe-produced electrofuels to enhance NATO’s energy resilience and operational readiness, examines how algorithmic foreign influence affects public perceptions of energy systems, evaluates floating Powerships as flexible energy generation assets for crisis response, and analyses the resilience of isolated electricity systems through the example of Kaliningrad’s energy network.

In addition, the issue presents lessons from two tabletop exercises. The NATO ENSEC COE Coherent Resilience 2025 – Arctic Tabletop Exercise examined vulnerabilities in Arctic energy operations, maritime infrastructure, and supply chains, while the Nordic Pine 2025 Exercise explored Europe’s ability to withstand coordinated hybrid threats, including cyberattacks, physical sabotage, and disinformation targeting energy systems.

Finally, Issue 22 highlights NATO ENSEC COE initiatives to foster the next generation of energy security professionals, including the launch of the Energy Highlights Writing Competition 2026 and a youth video competition on energy resilience, both designed to encourage fresh perspectives and greater youth engagement in addressing emerging energy security challenges.

Papers and Authors:

• Why electrofuels matter for European Military Energy Security
  • MATTEO MIROLO
• Algorithmic Foreign Influence in Energy Security: Powering the Cognitive Grid
  • ANGELO VALERIO TOMA
• Integrating Floating Powerships into Energy Strategies: Implications for Energy Security and Resilience from Case Events
  • ZAFER BAŞER
• Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast after the termination of the BRELL electric power system in 2025: Its Energy Security, Strategic Vulnerability, and Implications for NATO
  • KRISTINA RIMKUNAITE
• NATO ENSEC COE along with partners conducted COHERENT RESILIENCE 2025 – Arctic Tabletop Exercise
  • KAROL HELDT AND PAUL ADDINGTON
• Resilience as the Root of Energy Systems: Insights from the NATO Nordic Pine 2025 Exercise
  • MARLEN REIN, ENRIQUE KREMERS AND ANTON LIF

The exercise aimed to support national authorities and key energy sector stakeholders across the North American and European Arctic in strengthening the resilience of maritime energy installations and distribution networks against hybrid threats.

The event brought together nearly 120 participants from 21 nations including all Allied Arctic states, who came from 56 different organizations representing maritime, energy supply and security stakeholders (private, public and military), as well as NATO entities, the Joint Expeditionary Force and European Union institutions.

It examines the value and viability of energy-independent deployable military camps, assessing how new energy architectures, technologies, and operational concepts can enhance autonomy, reduce logistical burdens, and strengthen resilience across different climates and mission profiles. The issue also analyses the evolution of digitalised and interconnected energy systems, highlighting both the opportunities they offer for efficiency and flexibility and the new systemic and cyber risks they introduce. Established and emerging technologies for transforming ocean energy into electricity are assessed for their long-term strategic potential as part of a diversified and resilient energy mix. In addition, the increasingly blurred responsibilities for the protection of energy infrastructure are explored, particularly where civil, military, public, and private actors intersect.

Finally, Issue 21 highlights key NATO ENSEC COE initiatives, including the development of tools to track energy technologies across the Alliance, the flagship conference on energy and defence held in Vilnius, and the development of modelling capabilities to support decision-making on the integration of alternative fuels into military supply chains.

Papers and Authors:

• Energy Independent and Efficient Deployable Military Camps
  • Bernard Thonon as corresponding author for Project INDY

• Highly Decentralized and Intelligent Power Systems – Risks and Opportunities for Energy Security
  • Enrique Kremers

• Ocean Power Generating Technologies – A Vast Renewable Energy Potential
  • Jutta Lauf, Reiner Zimmermann, Wsewolod Rusow

• Blurred Lines: The Role of Security and Non-Security Actors in the Energy Landscape
  • Marie Becker, Michael Kalis

• The Energy Innovation and Technology Tracker (EITT) – A Flashlight in the Complex Energy Innovation Landscape
  • Marlen Rein

• Future Operations – Resilience in Transitioning Energy: Power in Partnership: Civil-Military Synergy for Energy Security
  • Kristina Rimkūnaitė

• Modelling Liquid Fuel Futures for Defence: Exploring the Role of Biofuels in European Supply Security with the New Biofuel Calculator
  • Ben Cook

ISSN 2335-7975

For defense planners, this presents both an opportunity and a headache. Energy is a key enabler of military operations. To maintain a warfighting advantage, planners must adopt innovative energy technologies faster than rivals. Yet navigating this complex, fast-moving and civilian-dominated sector is easier said than done. Most civilian breakthroughs offer little direct military purpose, and even fewer provide a clear operational edge.

The challenge is not a lack of options, but knowing which of them matter. Tools such as the Energy Innovation and Technology Tracker can help planners navigate the energy innovation landscape and cut through the noise. Still, every so often, a technology rises above the rest.

This article outlines three innovations which merit a closer look.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own, are contributed in a purely personal capacity, and may not represent those of NATO.

Lukas Trakimavicius is a Policy Officer working on Energy Security at NATO HQ. Previously, he led the energy portfolio at the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) in Paris, while also serving as a Non-Resident Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), based in Washington D.C. He also supported the World Energy Council’s work on energy innovation.

Before that Lukas worked at the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence, focusing on energy security and innovative energy tech. He also served at the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This article explores the ocean’s vastly untapped power production potential, the physical and chemical energy
forms as well as the conversion principles and technologies used. Some ocean power generation technologies
have already been exploited for decades and, in one case, centuries, with well-established technologies. Others are
currently in developing states or exist as prototypes only.

This article explains relevant technical terms followed by a technical discussion of the most intuitive technologies which harness the potential and kinetic energy of the tides and waves. Then the vast thermal energy of tropical oceans for producing electricity will be discussed as well as the technologies using spatial water salinity gradients.

The issue features the winners of our first-ever article competition, showcasing outstanding contributions from professionals and students alike. The Best Overall Submission award went to Justas Pakašius and Elvira Bermudez Fernandez for their article on critical energy infrastructure and civil-military cooperation. Best Student Award was presented to Allar Liivlaid for his innovative study on attack and defence scenarios for energy systems.

Alongside these prize-winning articles, readers will find insights from experts across NATO nations, highlighting diverse approaches to energy resilience, strategy, and technology. A special feature by NATO Assistant Secretary General Jean Charles Ellermann-Kingombe underscores the strategic importance of reliable energy for Allied security and operations.

This edition not only celebrates excellence in research but also continues the dialogue on energy security—an issue vital to NATO’s missions and global stability.

ISSN 2335-7975

NATO Allies rely on electricity supply to power estates and operations, and the way they consume it is changing rapidly. Electrification of the staff vehicle fleet is well underway, while demand is rising to support new technologies such as drones, advanced radar systems, and digital communications. Even combat vehicles are being considered for hybrid or fully electric powertrains, and directed energy weapons may soon see wider deployment. As a result, Allies must fully understand the long-term interaction between their demand profiles, national and local electricity systems, and wholesale energy markets.

Like civilian consumers, military entities have two primary options for securing electricity: generate it themselves or procure it from the grid. While many military estates and operational bases already generate electricity onsite – via diesel generators, renewables, or potentially nuclear power – most fixed infrastructure rely heavily on national electricity distribution networks. This creates a structural dependency: military capability is tied to the resilience of national grids and the ability of Distribution System Operators (DSOs) to balance loads effectively and reliably.

Data from the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) shows a sharp 46% increase in electricity consumption between 2017 and 2023. If this trend holds across the Alliance – driven by the electrification of platforms, infrastructure, and technology – military institutions may cement themselves as the largest institutional consumers of electricity in their nations. On this trend, we could expect MOD to consume around 2.7 TWh annually by 2030, outlined in the graph below.

Source: NATO ENSEC COE Analysis of Historic Data Collated from MOD Annual Accounts

In 2017, the total electricity demand for the UK was around 300 times higher than the MOD’s consumption. However, given the projected rise in military demand, the MOD’s share of the total national electricity demand could approach 1% by 2030.

This rise in demand must be accommodated by electricity distribution infrastructure. As military electricity demand increases, local DSOs must continue to balance supply, demand, and system frequency. Large, inelastic loads must be taken into account to avoid disruption. That means infrastructure must be able to support it: the network of cables, substations, and transformers must be able to meet this changing load profile.

Source: DESNZ Energy & Emissions Projections

These issues can also impact the wholesale prices of electricity, especially as MOD consumption remains largely unaffected by price fluctuations. When large loads lack prices elasticity, it puts upward pressure on wholesale prices in a tight market. This means that reducing reliance on grid-sourced electricity – for example, through building out on-site renewables – can also have positive implications for civil consumers.

Moreover, following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the desire to decrease dependence on energy imports has become more prominent. With this in mind, the potential for military demand to outstrip national electricity generation growth might be a concern for Allies. The interconnectedness of European electricity markets allows for smooth distribution of power across borders; however, maintaining sufficient generation ability within borders is beneficial from a supply security perspective. If NATO nations’ generation capacities do not keep pace with growing military demands, it could increase reliance on imports, potentially destabilising energy supplies.

Source: NATO ENSEC COE Analysis of DESNZ EEP and UK MOD Annual Accounts data

If the percentage of MOD demand versus national generation increases, it becomes a more important part of the domestic power system (unless that demand is served by on-site generation). With that, the importance of electricity system resilience to national defence becomes even greater. This demonstrates why ongoing efforts to secure infrastructure against hybrid threats is critical for operational effectiveness. 

Another key factor is Host Nation Support (HNS) – the civil and military assistance provided by a host country to NATO forces and institutions during peace, crisis, or conflict. As allied forces transit or operate within host territories, particularly on the Eastern Flank, they place growing logistical and energy burdens on host nations. These burdens may be expected to increase in the coming years. National military authorities are responsible for publishing a Capability Catalogue that outlines the personnel, equipment, and duration of support they can offer to NATO. It is critical for energy availability to be fully integrated into HNS planning.

To meet future demands, Ministries of Defence, DSOs, Transmission System Operators (TSOs), and Ministries of Energy must maintain strong, long-term partnerships. Each needs a long-term understanding of demand profiles under different scenarios – especially for surge or crisis conditions – and integrate them into national energy planning processes. This mitigates the risk of unanticipated burdens on infrastructure and supports more informed investment decisions.

Moreover, there is strategic value in increasing indigenous generation capacity at military bases. Deployable and modular energy systems – microgrids, mobile renewables, battery storage – can reduce reliance on national grids, enhance operational resilience, and increase flexibility in austere or contested environments.

Without coordinated foresight, NATO Allies risk facing operational constraints or placing stress on civilian energy systems at critical moments. A shared understanding of future military power demand – and the infrastructure, cybersecurity, and market conditions required to support it – must be a core element of both defence and national energy policy.

NATO ENSEC COE Support Field Test of Hybrid Generation System – strengthening onsite generation reduces reliance on grids and promotes resilience.

Holistic Civil-Military Energy Planning:

• Integrate military electricity demand into national energy planning

• Increase indigenous generation at military sites

• Address energy in Host Nation Support (HNS) planning

• Strengthen electricity system resilience against hybrid threats

• Coordinate with DSOs and TSOs under various scenarios

The energy industry played a significant role in warfare in the First and Second World Wars. Of course, it provided the energy needed to power military operations and estates. But it also diversified into and intensified production of unexpected products & services. The British gas industry produced toluene (used in explosives), dyes (for uniforms), medicines, and motor fuels alongside its usual outputs. For its role in the war machine, the Gorleston gasworks was the target of the first airborne attack in the United Kingdom of the First World War, bombed by a German Zeppelin airship.

At the orders of military leaders, British gasworks also intensified production of hydrogen during the Second World War. The lighter-than-air gas was needed to fill giant balloons which could be deployed above civilian areas or operations for defence against air attack. However, they also had calamitous impact on electricity networks, something which was ultimately harnessed offensively. The history of barrage balloons provides a valuable case study on the mobilisation of industry, the protection of energy infrastructure, and unintended consequences.

Mobilisation of Industry

The war effort required gasworks to increase hydrogen production to fill barrage balloons and enable their defensive deployment.

Barrage balloons were used in both World Wars, but it was perhaps the Second World War where they were most significant. Their main purpose was to ensure that enemy planes had to fly higher over cities and then were less accurate and at risk of colliding with the balloons or the steel cable attached to them if they flew beneath them. To harness this capability, an independent Balloon Command was established under Air Vice Marshall Sir Leslie Gossage in 1938. It became a sizable operation, with 52 operational squadrons flying about 5,000 barrage balloons, stationed right across Great Britain.

The balloons were silver in colour because the Egyptian cotton they were made from was covered with an aluminium powder. They were sizable at 64 ft. long and weighing around 600 pounds. They consisted of two compartments separated by a horizontal gas tight diaphragm. The upper compartment held hydrogen, and lower compartment was filled with air.

The gas industry in Great Britain played an important role in supplying gas to inflate these balloons and to supplement the production at chemical works in the North of England. Sixteen gasworks were chosen to supply additional hydrogen gas in locations ranging from Pontypool to Cambridge.

Hydrogen Plant in Torquay during WWII

Image source: National Gas Archives

Barrage balloons were typically used in a defensive manner, being stationed over key cities, towns and strategic locations, flown at a height of 5,000 feet. They also played a key role in protecting the D-Day landings, seen below. The gasworks at Poole and Torquay produced most of the hydrogen required for the barrage balloons used in the D-Day landings. The picture below shows the 320th Barrage Balloon Battalion on Omaha Beach, an African American United States Army unit, flying its balloons at low altitude to prevent strafing of the beaches. Altogether about 4,000 balloon personnel, together with balloons and hydrogen, took part in the Normandy landings, transported across the English Channel to protect the artificial harbours, captured ports and ammunition dumps of the Allied forces. Lord Ashburton, Group Captain in charge of the operation wrote: “the one shortage that never hit us was lack of hydrogen.” A tribute indeed to those working at the gasworks, and the public partnership with industry to support the war effort. 

Barrage balloons over Omaha Beach at low tide, first few days after D-Day, June 1944

Image source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barrage_balloon, Wikipedia Commons. Public Domain.

Calamitous Mistake to Offensive Capability

As the destructive potential of barrage balloons became clear, British military planners adapted them into a low-cost weapon to target enemy infrastructure.

However, while the gas industry was mobilised to produce the hydrogen required for the balloons, the electricity industry was the unwitting recipient of the unintended damage they could cause. Stray barrage balloons were reported to have caused more damage to the electricity infrastructure in the UK than the German Air Force did during the war. The main cause of disruption was the steel tether cables attached to the balloons: when these long, conductive wires came into contact with overhead power lines, they could cause short circuits, arcing, and mechanical breakage of insulators and cables. It was also possible for the balloons themselves became entangled in transmission towers, adding weight and tension that can led to structural collapse or line sagging. Supposedly, officials could even plot the course of balloons that had detached from their moorings by following the trail of blackouts and damaged substations across the grid. Ultimately, the Royal Air Force was dispatched to shoot them down to avoid further disruption and restore some measure of control over the electrical network.

From the start of the Second World War Air Vice Marshal E L Gossage, received a constant string of complaints from the electricity distributers regarding the damage done across Great Britain by stray barrage balloons. He went on to suggest that “advantages might be taken of this to impede and inconvenience the enemy.” When Winston Churchill, learned of the chaos they caused he said “if we can do this much damage by accident, what might we do on purpose.”

He immediately directed that the use of free flying balloons as a means of attacking Germany should be investigated, and the military were then tasked with planning for their use in an offensive capacity. Whilst the Air Ministry was reluctant to get involved, the admiralty was supportive. They were relatively cheap and did not risk any service personnel. It was well known that the design of the German power network made it vulnerable to damage by short circuit; the aim was to use the balloons to disrupt electrical systems in occupied Europe. The balloons would be equipped either with steel wires beneath them to damage power cables or armed with incendiary devices to cause fires in woodland.

Correct and accurate weather knowledge was required since balloons would only go where the wind would take them; they were in effect unguided weapons which could do indiscriminate damage. Planners determined, however, that the winter winds above 16,000 feet blew towards the continent and would be the best option to carry the balloons in the desired direction. Different types of balloons were used for offensive purposes than the defensive barrage balloons. Simpler models were made from latex, filled with hydrogen and fitted with a simple fuse system to control height and flight duration. They also dragged a 300 ft. section of 15-gauge steel piano wire.

These offensive balloon launches started in March 1942, from the east and south east coast of Great Britain. At the operation’s height, over 1,000 balloons were released per day. Whilst they inflicted significant damage to German infrastructure, national representative did not comment. The neutral countries of Sweden and Switzerland, however – who were also in the path of these balloons – complained bitterly through diplomatic channels of the considerable damage they caused to their overhead electricity lines.

Ultimately, the story of barrage balloons in the Second World War highlights the importance of co-ordinated planning between the military and civil sectors to avoid harmful unintended consequences. Moreover, it is clear that flexibility and responsiveness of industry played a major role in meeting evolving demand and enhancing capability.  

Four Lessons from the Barrage Balloon Campaign

1. Energy Infrastructure Has Been and Will Continue to be a Target

The vulnerability they exposed at home swiftly led to their repurposing as weapons abroad.
This gives us an archetypal example of the need to harden physical protection of energy infrastructure against the full range of threats.  Today, this extends to cyber.

2. Industrial Capability Can Enhance Security

The success of British gasworks’ rapidly scaling hydrogen production underscores the value of flexible, responsive industrial capacity in national resilience.

3. The Importance of Civil-Military Coordination

Tensions between military and civil institutions (e.g., over balloon-caused outages) highlight the need for holistic planning and clear lines of communication.

4. Dual-Use Technology

Tools designed for one purpose, such as defence, can have unforeseen applications. Modern parallels include AI, drones, and cyber tools that can be misused.