Firefighters, plant personnel and emergency response forces undertook urgent operations to suppress the fire and limit further releases. Many responders received severe radiation exposures, and some died as a result. Authorities evacuated the nearby city of Pripyat and other settlements, subsequently establishing the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone (CEZ), where access and land use remain restricted. Over subsequent decades, technical and environmental management measures have sought to limit the redistribution of residual contamination. Nevertheless, wildfires and flooding remain potential pathways for radionuclide remobilisation, and changes in climate-related hazards may affect the frequency or severity of such events.

This article assesses the potential consequences of wildfire- and flood-driven radionuclide remobilisation for Ukraine and neighbouring countries. It considers atmospheric dispersion and downstream transport through water systems, with particular attention to possible implications for public health, environmental security, military personnel and operational planning. It also examines how actual or perceived contamination risks could be exploited for coercive purposes, including through deniable hybrid activities.

The article first reviews the 1986 accident and the geographic characteristics of the affected area, including the CEZ. It then examines projected climatic changes in Ukraine and the land-cover characteristics relevant to wildfire and flood risk. The analysis focuses on two persistent radionuclides associated with the accident – caesium-137 (¹³⁷Cs) and strontium-90 (⁹⁰Sr) – and evaluates the mechanisms by which wildfire and flooding may remobilise them, drawing on measurements and modelling of past events. Finally, it considers potential health impacts and the implications of future climate-related hazards for contamination management and security planning.

That exposure is changing shape. The European refining base is closing faster than conventional demand is falling, with closures now reaching complex, jet-capable plants, while external jet suppliers have grown markedly more concentrated since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Alternative fuels offer genuine supply additionality, but the pipeline is far from guaranteed, and peacetime volumes are largely contracted to civil consumers. The consequence is that military demand need not grow at all for its weight in the residual conventional system to triple – it need only stand still while the civil system substitutes and rebuilds around it.

Drawing on a new supply-demand model informed by consultations across the Alliance, the paper tests the system against 252 possible worlds – 6,000 world-years – spanning demand pathways, refinery closures, alternative build-out and conflict. The system holds in most futures, but finds its limits in an Article 5-scale conflict with significant North American deployment to the European theatre. Five policy levers are outlined to mitigate that risk: re-indexing stock obligations, ringfencing strategic refinery capacity, accelerating alternative capacity, diversifying imports and hardening supply lines, and preparing civil demand management protocols. The paper quantifies the potential benefit of each to the supply-demand balance.  

The edition assesses the strategic potential of Europe-produced electrofuels to enhance NATO’s energy resilience and operational readiness, examines how algorithmic foreign influence affects public perceptions of energy systems, evaluates floating Powerships as flexible energy generation assets for crisis response, and analyses the resilience of isolated electricity systems through the example of Kaliningrad’s energy network.

In addition, the issue presents lessons from two tabletop exercises. The NATO ENSEC COE Coherent Resilience 2025 – Arctic Tabletop Exercise examined vulnerabilities in Arctic energy operations, maritime infrastructure, and supply chains, while the Nordic Pine 2025 Exercise explored Europe’s ability to withstand coordinated hybrid threats, including cyberattacks, physical sabotage, and disinformation targeting energy systems.

Finally, Issue 22 highlights NATO ENSEC COE initiatives to foster the next generation of energy security professionals, including the launch of the Energy Highlights Writing Competition 2026 and a youth video competition on energy resilience, both designed to encourage fresh perspectives and greater youth engagement in addressing emerging energy security challenges.

Papers and Authors:

• Why electrofuels matter for European Military Energy Security
  • MATTEO MIROLO
• Algorithmic Foreign Influence in Energy Security: Powering the Cognitive Grid
  • ANGELO VALERIO TOMA
• Integrating Floating Powerships into Energy Strategies: Implications for Energy Security and Resilience from Case Events
  • ZAFER BAŞER
• Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast after the termination of the BRELL electric power system in 2025: Its Energy Security, Strategic Vulnerability, and Implications for NATO
  • KRISTINA RIMKUNAITE
• NATO ENSEC COE along with partners conducted COHERENT RESILIENCE 2025 – Arctic Tabletop Exercise
  • KAROL HELDT AND PAUL ADDINGTON
• Resilience as the Root of Energy Systems: Insights from the NATO Nordic Pine 2025 Exercise
  • MARLEN REIN, ENRIQUE KREMERS AND ANTON LIF

The exercise aimed to support national authorities and key energy sector stakeholders across the North American and European Arctic in strengthening the resilience of maritime energy installations and distribution networks against hybrid threats.

The event brought together nearly 120 participants from 21 nations including all Allied Arctic states, who came from 56 different organizations representing maritime, energy supply and security stakeholders (private, public and military), as well as NATO entities, the Joint Expeditionary Force and European Union institutions.

It examines the value and viability of energy-independent deployable military camps, assessing how new energy architectures, technologies, and operational concepts can enhance autonomy, reduce logistical burdens, and strengthen resilience across different climates and mission profiles. The issue also analyses the evolution of digitalised and interconnected energy systems, highlighting both the opportunities they offer for efficiency and flexibility and the new systemic and cyber risks they introduce. Established and emerging technologies for transforming ocean energy into electricity are assessed for their long-term strategic potential as part of a diversified and resilient energy mix. In addition, the increasingly blurred responsibilities for the protection of energy infrastructure are explored, particularly where civil, military, public, and private actors intersect.

Finally, Issue 21 highlights key NATO ENSEC COE initiatives, including the development of tools to track energy technologies across the Alliance, the flagship conference on energy and defence held in Vilnius, and the development of modelling capabilities to support decision-making on the integration of alternative fuels into military supply chains.

Papers and Authors:

• Energy Independent and Efficient Deployable Military Camps
  • Bernard Thonon as corresponding author for Project INDY

• Highly Decentralized and Intelligent Power Systems – Risks and Opportunities for Energy Security
  • Enrique Kremers

• Ocean Power Generating Technologies – A Vast Renewable Energy Potential
  • Jutta Lauf, Reiner Zimmermann, Wsewolod Rusow

• Blurred Lines: The Role of Security and Non-Security Actors in the Energy Landscape
  • Marie Becker, Michael Kalis

• The Energy Innovation and Technology Tracker (EITT) – A Flashlight in the Complex Energy Innovation Landscape
  • Marlen Rein

• Future Operations – Resilience in Transitioning Energy: Power in Partnership: Civil-Military Synergy for Energy Security
  • Kristina Rimkūnaitė

• Modelling Liquid Fuel Futures for Defence: Exploring the Role of Biofuels in European Supply Security with the New Biofuel Calculator
  • Ben Cook

ISSN 2335-7975

For defense planners, this presents both an opportunity and a headache. Energy is a key enabler of military operations. To maintain a warfighting advantage, planners must adopt innovative energy technologies faster than rivals. Yet navigating this complex, fast-moving and civilian-dominated sector is easier said than done. Most civilian breakthroughs offer little direct military purpose, and even fewer provide a clear operational edge.

The challenge is not a lack of options, but knowing which of them matter. Tools such as the Energy Innovation and Technology Tracker can help planners navigate the energy innovation landscape and cut through the noise. Still, every so often, a technology rises above the rest.

This article outlines three innovations which merit a closer look.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own, are contributed in a purely personal capacity, and may not represent those of NATO.

Lukas Trakimavicius is a Policy Officer working on Energy Security at NATO HQ. Previously, he led the energy portfolio at the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) in Paris, while also serving as a Non-Resident Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), based in Washington D.C. He also supported the World Energy Council’s work on energy innovation.

Before that Lukas worked at the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence, focusing on energy security and innovative energy tech. He also served at the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This article explores the ocean’s vastly untapped power production potential, the physical and chemical energy
forms as well as the conversion principles and technologies used. Some ocean power generation technologies
have already been exploited for decades and, in one case, centuries, with well-established technologies. Others are
currently in developing states or exist as prototypes only.

This article explains relevant technical terms followed by a technical discussion of the most intuitive technologies which harness the potential and kinetic energy of the tides and waves. Then the vast thermal energy of tropical oceans for producing electricity will be discussed as well as the technologies using spatial water salinity gradients.

The issue features the winners of our first-ever article competition, showcasing outstanding contributions from professionals and students alike. The Best Overall Submission award went to Justas Pakašius and Elvira Bermudez Fernandez for their article on critical energy infrastructure and civil-military cooperation. Best Student Award was presented to Allar Liivlaid for his innovative study on attack and defence scenarios for energy systems.

Alongside these prize-winning articles, readers will find insights from experts across NATO nations, highlighting diverse approaches to energy resilience, strategy, and technology. A special feature by NATO Assistant Secretary General Jean Charles Ellermann-Kingombe underscores the strategic importance of reliable energy for Allied security and operations.

This edition not only celebrates excellence in research but also continues the dialogue on energy security—an issue vital to NATO’s missions and global stability.

ISSN 2335-7975

NATO Allies rely on electricity supply to power estates and operations, and the way they consume it is changing rapidly. Electrification of the staff vehicle fleet is well underway, while demand is rising to support new technologies such as drones, advanced radar systems, and digital communications. Even combat vehicles are being considered for hybrid or fully electric powertrains, and directed energy weapons may soon see wider deployment. As a result, Allies must fully understand the long-term interaction between their demand profiles, national and local electricity systems, and wholesale energy markets.

Like civilian consumers, military entities have two primary options for securing electricity: generate it themselves or procure it from the grid. While many military estates and operational bases already generate electricity onsite – via diesel generators, renewables, or potentially nuclear power – most fixed infrastructure rely heavily on national electricity distribution networks. This creates a structural dependency: military capability is tied to the resilience of national grids and the ability of Distribution System Operators (DSOs) to balance loads effectively and reliably.

Data from the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) shows a sharp 46% increase in electricity consumption between 2017 and 2023. If this trend holds across the Alliance – driven by the electrification of platforms, infrastructure, and technology – military institutions may cement themselves as the largest institutional consumers of electricity in their nations. On this trend, we could expect MOD to consume around 2.7 TWh annually by 2030, outlined in the graph below.

Source: NATO ENSEC COE Analysis of Historic Data Collated from MOD Annual Accounts

In 2017, the total electricity demand for the UK was around 300 times higher than the MOD’s consumption. However, given the projected rise in military demand, the MOD’s share of the total national electricity demand could approach 1% by 2030.

This rise in demand must be accommodated by electricity distribution infrastructure. As military electricity demand increases, local DSOs must continue to balance supply, demand, and system frequency. Large, inelastic loads must be taken into account to avoid disruption. That means infrastructure must be able to support it: the network of cables, substations, and transformers must be able to meet this changing load profile.

Source: DESNZ Energy & Emissions Projections

These issues can also impact the wholesale prices of electricity, especially as MOD consumption remains largely unaffected by price fluctuations. When large loads lack prices elasticity, it puts upward pressure on wholesale prices in a tight market. This means that reducing reliance on grid-sourced electricity – for example, through building out on-site renewables – can also have positive implications for civil consumers.

Moreover, following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the desire to decrease dependence on energy imports has become more prominent. With this in mind, the potential for military demand to outstrip national electricity generation growth might be a concern for Allies. The interconnectedness of European electricity markets allows for smooth distribution of power across borders; however, maintaining sufficient generation ability within borders is beneficial from a supply security perspective. If NATO nations’ generation capacities do not keep pace with growing military demands, it could increase reliance on imports, potentially destabilising energy supplies.

Source: NATO ENSEC COE Analysis of DESNZ EEP and UK MOD Annual Accounts data

If the percentage of MOD demand versus national generation increases, it becomes a more important part of the domestic power system (unless that demand is served by on-site generation). With that, the importance of electricity system resilience to national defence becomes even greater. This demonstrates why ongoing efforts to secure infrastructure against hybrid threats is critical for operational effectiveness. 

Another key factor is Host Nation Support (HNS) – the civil and military assistance provided by a host country to NATO forces and institutions during peace, crisis, or conflict. As allied forces transit or operate within host territories, particularly on the Eastern Flank, they place growing logistical and energy burdens on host nations. These burdens may be expected to increase in the coming years. National military authorities are responsible for publishing a Capability Catalogue that outlines the personnel, equipment, and duration of support they can offer to NATO. It is critical for energy availability to be fully integrated into HNS planning.

To meet future demands, Ministries of Defence, DSOs, Transmission System Operators (TSOs), and Ministries of Energy must maintain strong, long-term partnerships. Each needs a long-term understanding of demand profiles under different scenarios – especially for surge or crisis conditions – and integrate them into national energy planning processes. This mitigates the risk of unanticipated burdens on infrastructure and supports more informed investment decisions.

Moreover, there is strategic value in increasing indigenous generation capacity at military bases. Deployable and modular energy systems – microgrids, mobile renewables, battery storage – can reduce reliance on national grids, enhance operational resilience, and increase flexibility in austere or contested environments.

Without coordinated foresight, NATO Allies risk facing operational constraints or placing stress on civilian energy systems at critical moments. A shared understanding of future military power demand – and the infrastructure, cybersecurity, and market conditions required to support it – must be a core element of both defence and national energy policy.

NATO ENSEC COE Support Field Test of Hybrid Generation System – strengthening onsite generation reduces reliance on grids and promotes resilience.

Holistic Civil-Military Energy Planning:

• Integrate military electricity demand into national energy planning

• Increase indigenous generation at military sites

• Address energy in Host Nation Support (HNS) planning

• Strengthen electricity system resilience against hybrid threats

• Coordinate with DSOs and TSOs under various scenarios